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Ben-David and Papell's (1997) tests for structural breaks in international trade ratios 
over the post-WWII period revealed that trade ratios exhibited structural breaks in 
their paths and that postbreak trade averages exceeded prebreak averages. They 
attributed these breaks to trade liberalization policies executed during the postwar 
period. We reevaluate their results by comparing the postbreak trade ratios with 
extrapolated ratios based on the prebreak trend, and testing for structural breaks in the 
relative prices of imports (exports). We find that oil shocks rather than trade 
liberalization were the major factor behind the structural breaks in trade ratios.   
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1. Introduction 
International trade has not only grown dramatically since the Second World 
War, but has consistently grown more rapidly than world income. The world's share 
of merchandise exports in GDP increased from 5.5% in 1950 to 17.2% in 1998 
(Maddison, 2001). This trend has been attributed, among other factors,  to institutional 
harmonization and economic integration among world economies (Sachs and Warner, 
1995), increases in real output and international reserves (Rose, 1991), extensive trade 
liberalization measures as manifested by reductions in trade barriers (Rose, 1991; 
Krugman, 1995; Irwin, 1996), and lower transportation costs (Krugman, 1995; Irwin, 
1996). Ben-David and Papell (1997), BP hereafter, tried to determine if and when 
countries experienced structural breaks in the paths of their trade ratios (imports\GDP 
and exports\GDP ratios) by implementing sequential structural breakpoints tests.  
Recognizing for the possible effect of the 1973 oil shocks on imports prices, the 
authors conducted their analysis separately for imports and exports rather than on 
their sum  (a common measure of trade openness) to avoid masking relevant 
information that could occur by lumping together the two ratios.  In cases of 
significant structural breaks, they compared the averages of the trade ratios after the 
breakpoint to those before the breakpoint (hereafter referred to as BP's procedure). 
Since BP observed significant breaks and increases not only in the imports 
ratios but also in the exports ratios, they attributed the structural breaks and the rise in 
trade mainly to the trade liberalization reforms launched following the 
implementation of the Kennedy Round in 1968.  
In the present study we reevaluate these conclusions for the following reasons.  
First, the significant achievement of the Kennedy Round was a substantial reduction 
of tariffs on manufactured products, especially in technologically-advanced industries,   3
by developed countries. Thus, while we may expect large increases in the multilateral 
trade of these countries, we would not expect increases in imports of developing 
countries. Furthermore, the exports of the developing countries consisted mainly of 
raw materials and primary goods that were subjected to low or no tariffs by developed 
countries, and of processed agricultural products and textile, which received only 
modest tariff reductions in the Kennedy Round (Preeg, 1970).  Therefore, we would 
not expect structural breaks in the trade ratios of developing countries that constitute 
the bulk of BP’s sample. Second, most of trade breaks detected in BP's study had 
occurred during the 70's, a decade that witnessed the two major oil shocks of 1973 
and 1979, and the decade in which the large tariff reductions, following the Kennedy 
Round, were materialized. Therefore, testing for structural breaks and comparing the 
prebreak\postbreak trade average is insufficient to determine which of the two factors 
is more likely to cause the breaks, and further analysis is needed. Finally, despite the 
sharp reductions in tariffs, industrialized countries had adopted non-tariff-trade-
barriers to protect their affected industries (see Marvel and Ray, 1983 for the case of 
the US), so the overall effect of the Kennedy Round on substantially increasing trade 
is questionable.  
We implement a battery of tests to show that oil shocks rather than trade 
liberalization played the major role in determining the structural breaks in trade ratios. 
First, like BP, we test for structural breaks in the same two trade ratios by applying 
Vogelsang's (1997) test. However, instead of comparing the postbreak averages of the 
trade ratios to the prebreak averages as BP did, we compare them to the averages of 
the ratios that would have prevailed if the prebreak trend was to continue after the 
break. Our rationale is that since trade ratios were positively trending after WWII, one 
would expect the average of a trade ratio after any point of time to be higher than the   4
average before that point, regardless of whether it is a significant breakpoint or not. 
Therefore, a positive change in the trade average according to BP's procedure would 
not necessarily be the product of trade liberalization measures. Second, we compare 
the averages of trade ratios over the five years following the first phase of the tariff 
reductions in 1968 to those over the five years before 1968. We also compare the 
averages over the period 1968-72 to those of 1974, the year of the first oil shock.  
Finally, we test for structural breaks in the relative prices of trade to examine if 
structural breaks in relative prices are associated with structural breaks in nominal 
trade ratios. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the trade measures used in 
the paper as well as the data sources. Section 3 lays out the econometric methodology 
for performing the sequential trend break tests. Section 4 presents the empirical 
findings and compares them to those obtained using BP's procedure. Finally, Section 
5 summarizes our results and offers some concluding remarks. 
2. Measurement and Data Sources 
We test for structural breaks in the same two measures of trade openness used 
in BP's study: the share of nominal merchandise imports in nominal GDP (MY ratio) 
and the share of nominal merchandise exports in nominal GDP (XY ratio). Data for 
merchandise imports and exports, import prices, export prices, and GDP deflators 
were obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) 2005 CD. To 
calculate the trade ratios, GDP data were converted from IFS data in local currencies 
to $US using mid-year official exchange rates. Our sample covers 59 countries; the 
first observation is no later than 1957, and the last observation is of 1993. Therefore 
our sample includes countries with no less than 37 observations. Table A in the 
Appendix lists the countries examined and the year of the first observation. Since we   5
wish to contrast our results to those of BP, we also study the same period of time, 
namely 1948-1993.  
3. Trend Break Tests  
Earlier works on structural changes in a univariate time series were done under 
restrictive assumptions such as independent and identically distributed data, non-
trending data, and/or stationary data. In this paper, we apply Vogelsang (1997) test for 
detecting shifts in the trend function of a dynamic time series which successfully 
relaxes the aforementioned assumptions. The test allows for both serial correlation 
and trending data, and is valid whether or not the series is stationary. These features 
are important because the trade ratios exhibit unit roots, are obviously trending in 
most of the cases, and may be serially correlated as well. 
 For one break in quadratic trending data, Vogelsang’s (1997) Sup Wald (or 
SupWt) test involves estimating the following version of the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) regressions:  
where DUt and DTt   are break dummy-variables that take the values 
 
t R  in Equation (1) denotes either MY or XY. The period in which the change in the 
parameters of the trend function occurs will be referred to as the time of the break, or 
TB.  
  The exact specification of the test depends on the trending that characterizes 
the data. Equation (1) allows for both a linear and a quadratic trend in data, and 
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imposes the restrictions 0 2 2 = = γ β , and for non-trending data, model III, the 
restriction is 0 2 1 2 1 = = = = γ γ β β . 
  For each TB, the value of k (the number of lags in the right-hand side of 
equation (1)) has to be chosen. There exists considerable evidence that data dependent 
methods for selecting the lag length of k  are superior to making an a priori choice of 
k . We adopt an approach suggested by Perron and Vogelsang (1992) to determine the 
optimal lag length. We start with an upper bound of k=8, where if c8 is significant, k 
will take the value 8; otherwise we choose k=7 and check again if c7 is significant. 
We continue thusly until the last lag becomes significant; otherwise k=0 will be 
chosen.   
  Equation (1) is estimated sequentially for each break year with 15 percent 
trimming, i.e., for 0.15T< TB <0.85T, where T is the number of observations. For 
model I, SupWt is the maximum over all possible trend breaks, of three times the 
standard F-test statistic for testing the null hypothesis 0 2 1 = = = γ γ θ . For model II, 
SupWt is the maximum of two times the standard F for testing 0 1 = = γ θ , and for 
model III, SupWt is the maximum of the standard F-statistic for testing 0 = θ . 
  As mentioned, Vogelsang's test, which we use to determine the existence and 
timing of the trend breaks, is valid whether or not a unit root is present in a series. The 
critical values, however, depend on whether the series is stationary or contains a unit 
root. If the calculated values of the SupWt statistic are larger than the critical values 
under the unit root case calculated in Vogelsang (1997), we reject the null hypothesis 
of a no-trend break regardless of whether or not the data have a unit root.  If these 
values are smaller than the critical values of SupWt with a unit root, but larger than 
those in the stationary case, we have to test for unit roots. If these tests reject the null 
of a unit root then one can conclude that a breakpoint exists. We apply the Phillips-  7
Perron (1988) unit root test with a linear time trend to test for unit roots in the trade 
ratios series. 
The structural change literature provides little guidance regarding the choice 
of the trend to include in the estimated model. If the data have a linear or a quadratic 
trend, then estimating a model which does not contain the appropriate trend may fail 
to capture a significant break. On the other hand, the power to reject a no-trend-break 
null when there is a break is reduced when estimating a model which includes a trend 
that is not contained in the data (because the critical values increase with the inclusion 
of more trends). Here we use the following algorithm proposed by BP for model 
selection. First, model I, the model of quadratic trend, is estimated. If we reject the 
null of no-trend-break (at a 10 percent level or lower), then we report the SupWt test 
results. If the model I null cannot be rejected, then model II is estimated and the 
results are reported if we reject the null of no-trend-break. If model II null cannot be 
rejected, then model III is estimated and, like before, the results are reported if the 
null is rejected.  
4. Empirical findings 
The results of the Vogelsang SupWt test where significant breaks were 
detected are reported in Table 1. For the MY ratio, the no-trend-break null was 
rejected in 48 out of the 59 countries at the 10% significance level, 38 at the 5% level, 
and 23 at the 1% level.  For the XY ratio, the null of a no-trend-break was rejected in 
41 out of the 59 countries at the 10% significance level, 33 at the 5% level, and 21 at 
the 1% level. Most of the breaks were detected when the quadratic-trend model was 
applied (in 73% of the breaks for the imports\GDP ratio, and in 88% of the breaks for 
the exports\GDP ratio).    8
The breakpoint test only reveals if the time series has experienced a structural 
break during the period tested, but provides no information about the nature of the 
change. Therefore, a comparative analysis of the trade behavior before and after the 
break cannot be made.  To deal with this problem, BP compared the postbreak 
averages of trade ratios (either MY or XY) to the prebreak averages for countries 
where significant breaks were detected. They computed the percent changes in the 
postbreak to prebreak trade ratios and found that about 80% of the countries that had 
experienced significant breaks exhibited increases in trade shares. Although BP noted 
the possible effect of 1973 oil shocks on these breaks, they mostly attributed them to 
trade liberalization reforms that countries were undertaking, especially after the 
Kennedy Round between 1964 and 1967. 
In the following we reevaluate BP's comparative analysis of the 
prebreak\postbreak trade ratios using a different procedure. The raw data reveal clear 
upwarding trends in both of the  trade ratios, and therefore, when calculating the 
percent change in the postbreak to prebreak trade ratio, as BP did, it is most likely to 
be positive, regardless if there is a significant break or not. To illustrate this, we 
consider the cases of Finland and Germany. From Table 1, the SupWt statistic results 
reveal a significant break in the case of Germany in 1985 and a statistically 
insignificant break in 1979 in Finland's case. In both cases, the percent changes in 
postbreak to prebreak trade ratios are positive (11% for Finland and 18% for 
Germany). As can be seen from figures 1 and 2, prior to the breakpoints there were 
upward sloping trends of the MY ratios and despite the downward sloping of these 
trends after the breaks, the percent changes in the postbreak to prebreak trade ratios 
averages were still largely positive. Adopting BP's interpretation one can argue that 
Germany but not Finland had experienced a dramatic change in its imports\GDP as a   9
result of trade liberalization reforms that it might have undertaken prior to the break 
year. However, according to our graphs, both countries had shown very similar trends 
in their trade shares, and no one can argue that the turn from a positive into a negative 
sloping trend, following the break (or the most plausible break) is a possible result of 
trade liberalization. Figures 3-13 depict similar findings for both trade ratios where 
significant breaks were detected and where the postbreak trend is negatively sloped. 
We now show that the likelihood of a positive change in the trade ratio of a country 
chosen randomly at any point of time is independent of the significance of a break in 
that year and of trade liberalization. To accomplish this, we calculate the probability 
of a positive change in the trade ratio of country j at period TB, both chosen randomly, 
such as the following: 
) 1 /(
) 1 /(
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B , and I 
represents the indicator function that takes the value 1 if its argument is true, n is the 
number of countries, and  jt R represents a trade ratio of country j at period t. Table 2 
shows the calculated probabilities of a positive change for all the countries examined 
as well as for various groups of countries. 
As can be seen from Table 2, there is a two-thirds chance for a country chosen 
randomly at any point of time to experience a positive change in either one of its trade 
ratios, regardless if a significant break was detected in that year or not. For OECD 
countries, the probability of a positive change in the exports ratio is about 90%, and in 
all countries with no significant break, the probability of a positive change in the 
imports\GDP ratio is 79%, 15% larger than that in countries with significant breaks. 
Finally, it is worth noting that for the US, the probability is 100%, for both MY and   10
XY. These results indicate that a positive percent change in a country's trade ratios is 
not necessarily a result of trade liberalization. 
Next, we suggest a procedure for making a comparative analysis of the 
prebreak\postbreak changes in trade ratios that involves comparing the average of the 
observed postbreak trade ratios to the average that would have prevailed if the 
prebreak trend was to continue. The rationale for doing this is simple: if we assume a 
trend in the trade ratios, then the prebreak\postbreak comparison of the trade ratios 
should be based on this assumed trend. In other words, if a breakpoint is not detected, 
then beyond any point of time the observed trend is the same trend obtained by 
extrapolating the trend up to that point of time, and the calculated averages based on 
these trends will be identical. A dramatic positive change at a specific date would 
shift the trend above the continuation of the prebreak trend at least for some time after 
the break. This shift is of course sufficient for the postbreak average to exceed the 
prebreak one.  
Table 3 presents the percent changes in postbreak actual trade ratios to the 
extrapolated postbreak trade ratios based on the trend until the break date (labeled 
AA), and those based on BP's procedure.  For the imports\GDP trade ratio, in 29 out of 
the 48 countries where significant breaks were detected, the average of the actual 
values was lower than the average that would have prevailed if the prebreak trend was 
to continue. For example, in Belgium, the percent change in the imports\GDP 
averages according to our procedure is -22% compared to 39% according to BP's 
procedure; in Canada it is -28% compared to 22%; in France -25% compared to 62%; 
in Germany -33% compared to 189%; in Italy -12% compared to 46% , and in the UK 
-1.6% compared to 25%. In only 10 of these 29 countries, the postbreak average was 
lower than the prebreak average according to BP's procedure. In another five cases,   11
the averages of the actual data, even though higher than the average of the 
extrapolated values, still fall far below those computed using BP's procedure. For 
example, for the US, according to BP's calculation, the percent change in the 
imports\GDP ratio is 143% whereas according to ours it is only 3.1%. 
The results on the exports\GDP ratios show that in 28 out of the 41 countries 
where significant breaks were detected, the averages of the actual postbreak trade 
ratios were lower than the averages of the extrapolated values based on the 
continuation of the prebreak trend.  In Belgium, the percent change according to our 
procedure is -26% compared to 52% according to BP's procedure; in Germany it is -
27% compared to 61%, and in the UK -29% compared to 23%. In only 8 of these 28 
countries, the postbreak average was lower than the prebreak average according to 
BP's procedure. In five other cases, the percent changes according to our calculations 
are positive, however, they still fall far below those found using BP's procedure. 
These results are not in line with what one would expect for countries undergoing a 
process of trade liberalization. Engaging in trade liberalization reforms would entail 
the actual postbreak ratios being higher than the extrapolated ratios. In the following 
section we evaluate the effects of the Kennedy Round and the 1973 and 1979 oil 
shocks to determine which of these is more likely to be the cause of the structural 
breaks in these trade ratios 
4.1 The Kennedy Round and the Oil Shocks 
The Kennedy Round of the GATT, which lasted from 1963 to 1967, yielded 
agreements that significantly reduced tariff levels of developed countries on industrial 
products by a third on average (Preeg, 1970). BP argue that the Kennedy Round was 
the major determinant of the structural breaks in international trade that occurred in 
the 70s. Marvel and Ray (1983) suggest, however, that political pressures appear to   12
have shaped the pattern of protection which emerged from the Kennedy Round so the 
potential impact of the tariff reductions was partially offset by the introduction of 
nontariff trade barriers. Furthermore, Rose (1991), who tested for the determinants of 
imports\GDP ratios in OECD countries, found that even though tariff reductions were 
significantly related to growth in trade ratios in small countries, these reductions 
could not explain the trade growth in large countries.  
Now we implement a battery of tests to show that oil shocks rather than trade 
liberalization played the major role in determining the structural breaks in trade ratios. 
First, we evaluate the effects of the Kennedy Round on enhancing the growth in 
international trade by comparing the averages of trade ratios over the five years 
following the first phase of tariff reductions in 1968 (1968-1972) to those over the 
five years before 1968. The choice of 1972 was dictated by two reasons:  First, 1972 
is the year when reductions in the Kennedy Round were completed, and second to 
remove the possible effects of the first oil shock on these ratios.  Table 4 depicts the 
annual average of MY and XY ratios over the 1963-1967 and 1968-1972 periods for 
four groups of countries. As results show we were not able to reject the null that the 
mean of MY ratios over the 1968-72 is lower than that over the 1963-7 period, even at 
the 10% significance level in all cases. However, in all cases we reject the null that 
the mean of MY ratios over the 1968-72 is higher than that of 1974 at the 1% level. 
We get similar results for XY, however, for the OECD countries, the mean of XY 
ratios over the 1968-72 period is significantly higher than that over the 1963-67. 
Comparing the averages in 1974 to those over 1968-72 gives us insights into the 
relative contributions of tariff reductions and the oil shock to the changes in trade 
ratios. As the t-test results show, in each of the four groups of countries, the mean of   13
either MY or XY ratio is significantly higher in 1974 than that over the 1968-72 
period at the 1% level.  
Second, we look at the timing of the breaks and their closeness to the 1973/4 
and 1979/1980 oil shocks. The closer the years of trade breaks to the years of the oil 
shocks the higher the likelihood that the structural breaks are the results of these 
shocks. In our sample, between 1973 and 1981, 24 significant breaks were detected in 
imports ratios, which accounts for 55% of the total significant breaks. For the same 
period, 24 breaks were detected in export ratios, (64% of the total detected breaks). 
Since the effect of the oil shocks and the resulting price changes on trade ratios is 
country specific, we would not expect the break dates to match exactly with the dates 
of the oil shocks, should the latter were responsible for the breaks. Nonetheless, if we 
narrow the range and focus on the years 1973/4 and the 1979/80, we still find 14 
breaks (32%) in import ratios and 12 breaks in export ratios (33%). These results 
support our hypothesis that oil shocks rather than trade liberalization measures were 
more likely to have caused the structural breaks. 
Finally, we proceed to explicitly test for the effect of changes in relative prices 
of imports (exports) resulting from the oil shocks on trade breaks. To isolate the 
possible effect of price changes resulting from the oil shocks on the structural breaks 
of the trade ratios, it would be desirable to test for structural breaks in the real trade 
ratios or the relative prices of imports (exports).  Unfortunately, the lack of data for 
import and export prices for the majority of countries in this study prevents us from 
doing that. For countries where data are available, we use the following 
decomposition of a nominal trade ratio to test for structural breaks in relative prices of   14
imports (exports). 
prices   relative ratio    trade real
deflator   GDP
price   (exports)   imports
GDP   real
(exports)   imports   real
  
ratio    trade nominal
GDP   nominal
(exports)   imports   nominal
⋅ = ⋅ =
= ≡
 
Inspecting the evolution of the relative prices of US, the main focus of BP and 
the country with greatest growth rate of nominal MY ratio among the OECD 
countries over the 1968-1972 period, clearly explain the level shift of the nominal 
imports ratio in 1973. The SupWt test reveals a highly significant break in the relative 
prices of imports in 1973, the same year where a structural break was detected in the 
nominal import\GDP ratio. Not only that, but the level shift in relative prices of 
imports duplicates that of the nominal imports\GDP ratio (see Figures 14 and 15). 
Figure 16 shows that the actual postbreak trend of the real import\GDP ratio lays 
totally below the extrapolated postbreak trend. When we decompose the exports\GDP 
ratio, the break year in relative prices is 1972, the same year as the structural year in 
nominal exports\GDP ratio (see Figures 17 and 18). Figure 18 shows a sharp level rise 
in relative prices in 1972.  Figures 19-22 depict the structural shifts in the relative 
prices of imports (exports) for countries where postbreak trade ratios had incorporated 
positive level shifts. As can be seen, in almost all cases the break date is identical to 
the break date of the nominal trade ratio. Thus, it appears that the oil shocks rather 
than the trade liberalization policies are responsible for the significant breaks detected 
in the trade ratios.  
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we reevaluated Ben-David and Papell's claim that the structural 
breaks in trade shares during the post war period combined with higher postbreak 
trade averages compared to prebreak averages are the result of the trade liberalization 
that followed the Kennedy Round. We showed that a randomly chosen country has a   15
67% chance to increase its trade shares at any point of time, regardless if it had 
experienced a significant break at that point, if it had undertaken trade liberalization 
actions or not, and even if that country was not a GATT member by the break time. 
Furthermore, the averages of trade ratios of a country following a significant break to 
the averages that would be obtained if the trend preceding the break was to continue, 
reveals that actual averages are in general lower than those based on the extrapolated 
trends. We also found that the majority of the breaks had occurred around the time of 
the oil shocks of 1973/4 and 1979/80. Also, structural breaks in the nominal trade 
ratios trends that had incorporated a level shift, as in the case of the US, coincided 
with a strong level shift in the trend of the relative prices of imports (exports). In light 
of these findings we conclude that, contrary to BP, the oil shocks of the 70s, and the 
resulting drastic changes in the relative prices of imports (exports) are responsible for 
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Table 1 - Results of Sequential Trend Break Tests 
∑
=
− + + + + + + + =
k
j





2 1 ε γ γ θ β β    
  Import-GDP ratios  Export-GDP ratios 
  Country  Break 
Year 
Model  SupWt  Country  Break 
Year 
Model  SupWt 
1  Algeria   1962  I  39.1***  Australia  1971  III  19.3** 
2  Australia  1971  I  31.6**  Austria  1985  I  22.14
+++ 
3  Austria  1968  I  36.0**  Belgium  1974  I  30.3* 
4  Belgium  1983  I  53.3***  Brazil  1982  I  69.6*** 
5  Brazil  1974  I  35.7**  Cyprus  1975  I  46.9*** 
6  Canada  1981  I  29.8*  Ecuador  1971  II  22.94* 
7  Colombia  1977  III  13.15
+++  El Salvador  1980  I  86.4*** 
8  Costa Rica  1982  II  38.5***  Finland  1981  I  50.7*** 
9  Denmark  1972  I  28.0*  France  1970  I  29.9* 
10  Dominican R.  1984  III  19.1**  Germany  1985  I  36. 8** 
11  Ecuador  1985  I  29.93*  Ghana  1971  I  44.4*** 
12  France  1966  I  100.8***  Guyana  1981  I  28.4* 
13  Germany  1985  I  46.1***  Guatemala  1980  II  29.1** 
14  Greece  1971  I  34.7**  Haiti  1979  I  55.1*** 
15  Guatemala  1981  I  55.5***  Honduras  1980  I  70.2*** 
16  Guyana  1978  I  48.9***  Iceland  1974  I  32.2** 
17  Haiti  1978  III  29.5***  India  1975  I  82.9*** 
18  Honduras  1973  I  29.5*  Ireland  1971  I  28.7* 
19  Iceland  1974  II  22.9*  Italy  1979  I  102.9*** 
20  India  1973  I  28. 5*  Jamaica  1979  I  29.9* 
21  Ireland  1978  I  56.5***  Japan  1977  I  34.6** 
22  Italy  1973  I  123.8***  Mexico  1981  I  62.6*** 
23  Jamaica  1975  I  22.32
+++  Netherlands  1981  I  75.1*** 
24  Japan  1985  II  23.4*  Nigeria  1979  I  24.43
+++ 
25  Korea  1968  I  29.6*  Norway  1985  I  39.9*** 
26  Mauritius  1972  III  12.43
+++  Pakistan  1971  I  57.0*** 
27  Morocco  1972  I  43.9***  Panama  1973  I  31.5** 
28  Netherlands  1985  I  68.5***  Peru  1976  I  17.99
++ 
29  New Zealand  1973  II  33.2***  Philippines  1980  I  19.51
++ 
30  Nigeria  1979  I  23.28
+++  S. Africa  1971  I  30.4* 
31  Norway  1977  III  20.7**  Spain  1983  I  53.3*** 
32  Pakistan  1977  III  21.67**  Singapore  1980  I  28.70* 
33  Panama  1973  I  86.0***  Sri Lanka  1977  I  137.3*** 
34  Paraguay  1987  I  33.1**  Sudan  1981  I  37.4** 
35  Philippines  1983  II  25.4**  Sweden  1974  I  41.5*** 
36  Portugal  1978  I  45.4***  Switzerland  1975  I  31.6** 
37  Singapore  1979  I  38.2**  Thailand  1985  III  21.6** 
38  S. Africa  1979  II  23.9**  Trinidad & Tobago  1973  I  69.1*** 
39  Sri Lanka  1977  I  88.9***  UK  1977  I  34.1** 
40  Sudan  1985  I  31.1**  USA  1972  III  27.3*** 
41  Sweden  1973  I  40.1***  Venezuela  1981  I  27. 72
+++ 
42  Switzerland  1974  I  28.7*         
43  Thailand  1987  II  24.0*         
44  Trinidad & Tobago  1973  I  65.6***         
45  UK  1973  I  56.4***         
46  USA  1973  I  34.1**         
47  Venezuela  1976  I  38.3**         
48  Zambia  1971  I  37.4**         
 
***,**, and * denote statistical significance using unit root critical values at the 1, 5, and 10% levels 
from Table 2 of Vogelsang (1997). For model I, these values are 38.35, 31.29, and 27.99, respectively. 
For model II, the critical values are 30.36, 25.10, and 22.29, respectively. And, for model III the critical 
values are 22.48, 17.88, and 15.78, respectively.  
+++,
++, and 
+ denote statistical significance using stationary critical values at the 1, 5, and 10% levels 
from Table 2 of Vogelsang (1997). For model I, these values are 19.9, 15.84, and 13.96, respectively. 
For model II, the critical values are 17.51, 13.29, and 11.25, respectively. And, for model III the critical 
values are 13.02, 9.0, and 7.32, respectively.    18
 
 
Table 2 - Probability that the percent change in the postbreak to prebreak trade 
ratio is positive for an arbitrary break year 
Group of Countries  Imports\GDP ratio  Exports\GDP ratio 
All Countries  67.4%  62.9% 
Countries with significant breaks  63.9%  66.0% 
Countries with no significant break  78.7%  58.9% 
OECD  68.0%  89.3% 
Non-OECD   67.1%  47.1% 
Non-OECD with significant breaks  62.5%  44.4% 
USA  100%  100% 
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Table 3 - Trend Breaks and Changes in Trade 
  Import-GDP ratios  Export-GDP ratios 












1  Algeria   1962  -35.8  -34.6§  Australia  1971  -17.3  -17.3 
2  Australia  1971  -17.9  -49.1  Austria  1985  29.8  1.8 
3  Austria  1968  35.9  110.7  Belgium  1974  51.9  -26.2 
4  Belgium  1983  39.1  -21.8  Brazil  1982  19.3  5.0 
5  Brazil  1974  -15.5  -38.9  Cyprus  1975  2.4  -27.5 
6  Canada  1981  21.6  -28.2  Ecuador  1971  45.6  112.1 
7  Colombia  1977  14.3  14.3  El Salvador  1980  -41.5  -65.1 
8  Costa Rica  1982  9.2  -25.8  Finland  1981  15.4  -32.6 
9  Denmark  1972  -2.2  104.3  France  1970  60.8  -13.0 
10  Dominican R.  1984  53.2  53.2  Germany  1985  23.5  -26.7 
11  Ecuador  1985  23.4  37.2  Ghana  1971  -48.7  -14.0 
12  France  1966  61.5  -25.2  Guyana  1981  16.2  -20.0 
13  Germany  1985  18.2  -32.9  Guatemala  1980  -9.0  -37.7 
14  Greece  1971  33.0  359.3  Haiti  1979  -27.0  -63.8 
15  Guyana  1978  37.3  -27.3  Honduras  1980  -10.4  -49.0 
16  Guatemala  1981  15.3  -31.4  Iceland  1974  7.1  5.3 
17  Haiti  1978  43.3  43.3  India  1975  21.1  -31.9 
18  Honduras  1973  17.9  -2.6  Ireland  1971  99.2  61.8 
19  Iceland  1974  -6.1  -12.9  Italy  1979  37.8  -37.9 
20  India  1973  23.8  100.6§  Jamaica  1979  12.2  -21.7 
21  Ireland  1978  20.8  -33.3  Japan  1977  15.6  -28.5 
22  Italy  1973  46.0  -11.8  Mexico  1981  127.8  56.8 
23  Jamaica  1975  25.9  -25.6  Netherlands  1981  14.7  -20.5 
24  Japan  1985  -37.6  -36.4  Nigeria  1979  38.5  -43.1 
25  Korea  1968  115.9  -65.4  Norway  1985  20.9  -26.7 
26  Mauritius  1972  29.6  29.6  Pakistan  1971  48.9  185.7§ 
27  Morocco  1972  21.5  18.5  Panama  1973  9.1  -47.8 
28  Netherlands  1985  -13.2  -30.9  Peru  1976  -25.3  342.95 
29  New Zealand  1973  2.5  100.7  Philippines  1980  47.4  -20.86 
30  Nigeria  1979  10.1  -22.8  Singapore  1980  15.7  -51.9 
31  Norway  1977  -22.5  -22.5  S. Africa  1971  -7.9  351.2 
32  Pakistan  1977  58.3  58.3  Spain  1983  78.7  -22.4 
33  Panama  1973  7.2  -26.7  Sri Lanka  1977  -1.8  89.2 
34  Paraguay  1987  71.2  126.3  Sudan  1981  -57.6  33.5§ 
35  Philippines  1983  50.4  2.1  Sweden  1974  31.3  -33.9 
36  Portugal  1978  50.1  -5.0  Switzerland  1975  22.8  -1.3 
37  Singapore  1979  55.5  -45.7  Thailand  1985  58.0  58.0 
38  S. Africa  1979  -10.3  38.4  Trinidad 
&Tobago  
1973  -16.6  -28.3 
39  Sri Lanka  1977  48.9  191.9  UK  1977  23.3  -28.6 
40  Sudan  1985  -38.9  -41.8  USA  1972  69.6  69.6 
41  Sweden  1973  22.7  10.2  Venezuela  1981  -16.8  -24.6 
42  Switzerland  1974  10.5  -15.0         
43  Thailand  1987  75.5  44.0         
44  Trinidad & 
Tobago  1973  -30.9  -61.8         
45  UK  1973  24.5  -1.6         
46  USA  1973  143.0  3.1         
47  Venezuela  1976  7.0  -31.9         
48  Zambia  1971  -57.4  -56.7         
     
§ The prebreak trend was downward sloping so the average of the extrapolated ratios was negative, for this reason we compared 
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Table 4- Trade Averages Before and After the First Phase of Tariff Reductions 
of the Kennedy Round 
Group of Countries  Trade 
Ratio  
Statistics  1963-7  1968-72  1974 
R   30.71  29.36  40.82 
MY 
t-test (Pvalue)  -0.99 (0.838)  -2.27 (0.014) 
R   22.49  21.96  29.9 
All countries in sample 
XY 
t-test (Pvalue)  -0.91 (0. 815)  -3.02 (002) 
R   22.11  22.55  29.40 
MY 
t-test (Pvalue)  0.89 (0.188)  -8.07 (0.000) 




t-test (Pvalue)  -0.46 (0.680)  -4.42 (0.000) 
R   21.18  21.68  27.9 
MY 
t-test (Pvalue)  1.08 (0.146)  -8.40 (0.000) 
R   17.06  18.40  22.1 
OECD countries 
XY 
t-test (Pvalue)  3.19 (0.004)  -5.45 (0.000) 
R   21.63  20.60  28.1 
MY 
t-test (Pvalue)  -0.71 (0.750)  -2.54 (0.020) 
R   20.41  18.80  28.1 
LDCs members of 
GATT by Kennedy 
Round  XY 
t-test (Pvalue)  -1.65 (0.930)  -1.89 (0.050) 
R denotes the average of the relevant trade ratio over the specified period. 
The figure in the first cell of t-test raw is the t-test statistics value for testing the null 
67 63 72 68 0 : − − <     H and the figure in the second cell is the t-test statistics value for testing the 
null 74 72 68 0 :     > − H , the corresponding p-values are in parentheses.    21
 
 









1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation































1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation































1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation































1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation



































1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual 
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation

































1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation






























1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation
































1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation































1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation
































1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation






























1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation

































1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation































1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation































1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation

































1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation









































1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation










































1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Estimated Values
Prebreak Estimated Values and Extrapolation































1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation









































1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation











































1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation






































1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation









































1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation











































1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Actual
Postbreak Fitted Values
Prebreak Fitted Values and Extrapolation



























































   33
 
Appendix: Table A   
No.  Country  Start  No.  Country  Start 
1  Algeria  1950  31  Japan  1952 
2  Australia  1949  32  Korea  1953 
3  Austria  1948  33  Malaysia  1955 
4  Barbados  1950  34  Malta  1954 
5  Belgium  1953  35  Mauritius  1952 
6  Brazil  1948  36  Mexico  1948 
7  Canada  1948  37  Morocco  1952 
8  Colombia  1950  38  Netherlands  1956 
9  Costa Rica  1950  39  New Zealand  1948 
10  Cyprus  1950  40  Nigeria  1950 
11  Denmark  1950  41  Norway  1949 
12  Dominican  1950  42  Pakistan  1953 
13  Ecuador  1950  43  Panama  1950 
14  Egypt  1952  44  Paraguay  1950 
15  El Salvador  1951  45  Peru  1948 
16  Finland  1950  46  Philippines  1948 
17  France  1950  47  Portugal  1953 
18  Germany  1957  48  Singapore  1957 
19  Ghana  1950  49  South Africa  1950 
20  Great Britain  1948  50  Spain  1954 
21  Greece  1948  51  Sri Lanka  1950 
22  Guatemala  1950  52  Sudan  1957 
23  Guyana  1952  53  Sweden  1950 
24  Haiti  1955  54  Switzerland  1948 
25  Honduras  1950  55  Thailand  1950 
26  Iceland  1950  56  Trinidad- Tobago   1951 
27  India  1950  57  United States  1948 
28  Ireland  1948  58  Venezuela  1950 
29  Italia  1951  59  Zambia  1956 
30  Jamaica  1950       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 